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Labor Law-lInjunctions-COURT MAY ENJOIN SYMPATHY STRIKE
WHERE PURPOSE AND EFFECT Is To COMPEL CONCESSION OF ARBI-
TRABLE ISSUE
Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW Local 1759,
560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
46 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Jan. 23, 1978) (No. 77-796).
In Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW Local 1759,1 the Fourth Circuit held
that a court may enjoin a sympathy strike2 the object of which is to
compel an employer to concede an arbitrable issue to the primary
strikers.3 The decision is significant in two ways. First, Cedar Coal
seemingly conflicts with the Supreme Court's recent rejection of a
sympathy strike injunction in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel-
workers.4 Careful analysis reveals, however, that Cedar Coal com-
ports with the policy concerns underlying recent Supreme Court
action in the labor injunction area. Second, and more important,
the Cedar Coal standard for invoking injunctive relief differs
markedly from that employed in earlier court of appeals decisions.5
This fresh approach provides a useful and rationally supportable
principle for courts to apply when asked to enjoin secondary work
stoppages.
I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Early in this century the federal judiciary's unrestrained use of
anti-union injunctions threatened the existence of organized
labor.6 In 1932, Congress responded by enacting the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,' prohibiting federal courts from granting injunc-
1 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Jan. 23, 1978) (No.
77-796).
2 A sympathy strike occurs where one union honors picket lines established by another
union, and stops work itself. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S.
397, 399-405 (1976). Thus, a sympathy strike does not involve an independent dispute
between the union honoring the picket line and the employer against whom the other
union is striking. The sympathy strikers' work stoppage is based solely upon their desire to
support the other union.
3 560 F.2d at 1168-71.
4 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
5 See notes 19-24 and accompanying text infra.
6 See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 66-133 (1930). Employers
had little difficulty securing wide-ranging injunctive relief against strikes. See id. at 86-89.
7 Pub. L. No. 65, 47 Stat. 70 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970)).
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tive relief against strikes.8 But, "[a]s labor organizations grew in
strength and developed toward maturity, congressional emphasis
shifted from protection of the nascent labor movement to the en-
couragement of collective bargaining and to administrative tech-
niques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes." 9 In 1947,
Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, 10 which amended the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935"1 and granted federal district
courts jurisdiction over suits arising from the violation of collective
bargaining agreements.12
The Taft-Hartley Act created a fundamental conflict in federal
8 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute .. .from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or vio-
lence the acts heretofore specified ....
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
' Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
10 Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970)). The Taft-Hartley Act sought to forestall the widespread eco-
nomic disruption that accompanies long-term industrial strife. Section 1(b) of the Act pro-
vides in pertinent part:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow
of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers
... to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which
affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights
of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1970).
11 Pub. L. No. 198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
167 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
12 Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970)) provides in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce .. .may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of § 301, see Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485-546 (1957) (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.)
(app.).
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labor policy: protecting collective bargaining agreements fre-
quently necessitated the use of equitable remedies proscribed by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770,'3 the Supreme Court sought to accommodate these conflicting
goals. The collective bargaining agreement in Boys Markets con-
tained a binding arbitration clause and an express no-strike provi-
sion. When the union refused to accept an arbitrated resolution of
a dispute and went on strike, the employer sought an injunction.
Overruling a decision in point,14 Boys Markets held that section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not an absolute bar to all injunctive
relief.' 5 Emphasizing the strong federal policy favoring arbitral
resolution of labor disputes,' 6 the Court stated that section 4 's
13 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
14Boys Markets overruled Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). See 398
U.S. at 238. In Sinclair an employer brought a § 301 suit to enjoin a strike that allegedly
violated the compulsory arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement. Relying
on § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (see note 8 supra), the Court denied injunctive relief.
370 U.S. at 203. The Court stressed that the enactment of § 301 did not restrict the
applicability of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, "[f]or the legis-
lative history of § 301 shows that Congress actually considered the advisability of repealing
the Norris-LaGuardia Act insofar as suits based upon breach of collective bargaining agree-
ments are concerned and deliberately chose not to do so." Id. at 205. This congressional
inaction, the Court concluded, compelled a strict application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
prohibition against anti-strike injunctions. Id. at 209-10.
The majority position in Sinclair drew a vigorous dissent from Justice Brennan. He
warned that "[i]nsistence upon strict application of Norris-LaGuardia to a strike over a
dispute which both parties are bound by contract to arbitrate threatens a leading policy of
our labor relations law." Id. at 225. Taking a policy-oriented view of statutory interpreta-
tion, Justice Brennan stressed the need for an accommodation between the contradictory
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley Acts. Id. at 215-25. When faced with
a conflict between statutes, he reasoned, the Court should "so exercise its judgment as best
to effect the most important purposes of each statute. It should not be bound by inscruta-
ble congressional silence to a wooden preference for one statute over the other." Id. at 224.
The Court split five to three, Justice Frankfurter taking no part in the decision. Id. at 215.
"5 See 398 U.S. at 240-55. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, in which five
other Justices joined. Id. at 237. Justice Stewart, who joined in the majority opinion, also
filed a brief concurrence. Id. at 255. Justices Black and White each filed dissenting opin-
ions (id.; id. at 261), and Justice Marshall took no part in the decision (id. at 255).
6 See id. at 241-43. See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These three deci-
sions, popularly known as the Steelworkers' Trilogy, definitively established the primacy of
arbitration as a dispute-resolution mechanism and de-emphasized the supervisory role of
the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court stated:
[To be consistent with congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes by
the parties through the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under § 301
[of the Taft-Hartley Act] must be strictly confined to the question whether the
reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbi-
trator power to make the award he made. An order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that
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terms "must be accommodated to the subsequently enacted provi-
sions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the
purposes of arbitration. Statutory interpretation requires more
than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must
be given to the total corpus of pertinent law ... ."I' The Court
stressed, however, that its holding was a "narrow one," confined to
situations "in which a collective-bargaining contract contains a
mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure."'"
The courts of appeals split sharply over the proper application
of Boys Markets to sympathy strike cases. The Second, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits read the case narrowly. They refused to grant in-
junctive relief unless the strike was "over" an arbitrable dispute. 19
This narrow focus invariably presaged denial of injunctive relief in
the sympathy strike context.20 The Third, 2 1 Fourth, 22 and Eighth 23
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the as-
serted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
17 398 U.S. at 250.
'
8 Id. at 253. The Court noted that the injunctive remedy would not be appropriate in
every instance of a strike over an arbitrable grievance; the employer's willingness to arbi-
trate must coincide with the threat of irreparable injury traditionally required for equitable
relief. Id. at 254. The Boys Markets majority adopted a passage from Justice Brennan's
Sinclair dissent (see note 14 supra) as stating the test to be applied in determining the ap-
propriateness of injunctive relief:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive
relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in
which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no in-
junctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and the
employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunc-
tion against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider
whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles
of equity-whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been
threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irrepar-
able injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the
denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance.
398 U.S. at 254 (quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (dissenting
opinion, Brennan, J.) (emphasis in original)).
"See, e.g., Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union, 520 F.2d 1220,
1228 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (app.), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976); Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2d Cir. 1975), affd, 428 U.S. 397 (1976);
Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373
(5th Cir. 1972). Justice Brennan coined the "over an arbitrable grievance" test in his
Sinclair dissent. See 370 U.S. at 228. The test was adopted by the majority in Boys Markets.
See 398 U.S. at 254.
20 See notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra.
21 See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
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Circuits read Boys Markets more broadly; where comprehensive ar-
bitration provisions applied, courts in these circuits were quick to
enjoin sympathy strikes. The Seventh Circuit embraced an inter-
mediate approach.24
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers25 provided the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to resolve this conflict among the cir-
cuits. The company's production and maintenance employees
worked under a collective bargaining agreement that contained an
express no-strike clause and mandatory arbitration provisions. The
office and technical employees of the same company struck when
negotiations leading toward their first collective bargaining agree-
ment broke down. All parties agreed that this "strike and [accom-
panying] picket line were bona fide, primary, and legal. 'z When
the production and maintenance workers honored the picket line,
the company sued to enforce that union's no-strike obligation. Em-
phasizing the limited scope of Boys Markets, the five-man Buffalo
Forge majority27 held that the sympathy strike could not be en-
joined pending the arbitrator's construction of the production and
maintenance workers' no-strike clause:
U.S. 877 (1975); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automobile Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321
(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). The Island Creek court emphasized
the breadth of the compulsory arbitration provisions of the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement, the applicable collective bargaining accord. 507 F.2d at 653-54. The
collective bargaining agreement in NAPA contained a provision that explicitly permitted
the union to honor a "primary" picket line; the dispute there focused upon the proper
construction of "primary." 502 F.2d at 322-24.
22 See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 877 (1975); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Monongahela Power Co. v. Electrical Workers, 484 F.2d 1209
(4th Cir. 1973).2 3 See, e.g., Valmac Indus. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975),
vacated, 428 U.S. 906 (1976).
24 Noting that the collective bargaining agreement in question contained an "excep-
tionally broad" arbitration clause, the Seventh Circuit upheld the issuance of injunctive
relief against a sympathy strike in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 298
(7th Cir. 1974). But see Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975). In Hyster and Gary Hobart, the court denied
injunctive relief where the relevant arbitration clauses were narrowly drawn. This examina-
tion of the scope of the applicable arbitration clause was similar to the approach adopted
by the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits. It is important to note, however, that these
circuits generally granted injunctions. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's cautious review of
the scope of the arbitration clause in Hyster and Gary Hobart produced results similar to
those reached by the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.
25 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
216 Id. at 403.
27 Justice White, a dissenter in Boys Markets, wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 399.
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Boys Markets plainly does not control this case. The District
Court found, and it is not now disputed, that the strike was not
over any dispute between the Union and the employer that was
even remotely subject to the arbitration provisions of the con-
tract. The strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support of
sister unions negotiating with the employer; neither its causes
nor the issue underlying it was subject to the settlement proce-
dures provided by the contracts between the employer and re-
spondents. The strike had neither the purpose nor the effect of
denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving the
employer of his bargain. 28
The Court stressed that enjoining the sympathy strike would not
further the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor-man-
agement conflicts. The sympathy strike involved only one arbitra-
ble issue: the applicability of the no-strike clause in the sympathy
strikers' contract. A work stoppage pending arbitration of this issue
would not, in the Court's view, induce the employer to concede it.29
Moreover, the Court feared that a broad reading of Boys Markets
might embroil the federal judiciary
in a wide range of arbitrable disputes under the many existing
and future collective-bargaining contracts, not just for the pur-
pose of enforcing promises to arbitrate, which was the limit of
Boys Markets, but for the purpose of preliminarily dealing with
the merits of the factual and legal issues that are subjects for the
arbitrator and of issuing injunctions that would otherwise be for-
bidden by the Norris-LaGuardia ActA0
Justice Stevens, joined by three of his colleagues, filed a vigorous
dissent.3 1
28 Id. at 407-08 (emphasis in original).
29 Id. at 410. The Court's conclusion is sound; a strike pending an arbitrator's deter-
mination of the scope of a no-strike clause does not force the employer to concede the
merits of a dispute, With a typical primary strike, an employer is confronted with ongoing
economic loss that threatens to exceed the cost of capitulation. Hence, it is in the
employer's interest to concede the arbitrable issue. In contrast, with a sympathy strike
where the only issue is the applicability of a no-strike clause, an employer has no incentive
to concede that the clause is inapplicable. Capitulation will serve only to condone the sym-
pathy strike; the primary strike will continue regardless of the relationship between the
sympathy strikers and their employer. As long as the primary strike continues and the
sympathy strikers honor the picket line, the employer's economic loss continues. Moreover,
to concede could cost the employer the eventual right to recover damages against the sym-
pathy strikers, assuming the employer was not already faced with the loss of this right
through a "no-reprisal" strike, i.e., a strike threatened to continue until the employer
agrees not to seek damages stemming from the sympathy work stoppage.
3 1 Id. at 410-11 (footnote omitted).
31 Id. at 413. Noting that "[a] contractual undertaking not to strike is the union's nor-
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In short, Boys Markets carved out a significant exception to the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: primary
strikes are enjoinable if the underlying dispute is subject to a bind-
ing arbitration clause. Buffalo Forge dealt with a different situation,
holding that a court may not enjoin a sympathy strike when the
dispute underlying the primary strike is not subject to binding
arbitration. Cedar Coal posed a related, but unresolved, ques-
tion-whether a court can enjoin a sympathy strike where the dis-
pute underlying the primary strike is arbitrable.
II
CEDAR COAL Co. v. UMW LOCAL 1759
In Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW Local 1759,32 a consolidation of
three appeals, 33 the Fourth Circuit attempted to clarify the effect
of Buffalo Forge on Boys Markets. In each of the consolidated cases, a
district court had denied a preliminary injunction against work
stoppages precipitated by ajob classification grievance34 brought by
mal quid pro quo for the employer's undertaking to submit grievances to binding arbitra-
tion," Justice Stevens saw no reason to divide the union's no-strike duty into two "sever-
able" obligations, one enforceable by injunction, the other not. Id. Stressing that "the policy
favoring arbitration equally favors the making of enforceable agreements to arbitrate" (id.
at 423), Justice Stevens argued that preliminary injunctive relief should be granted
whenever there is "convincing evidence that the strike is clearly within the no-strike
clause." Id. at 431. Such a policy, he asserted, "will not critically impair the vital interests of
the striking local even if the right to strike is upheld." Id. at 429.
This last assertion is subject to serious challenge. The efficacy of a strike may turn on
its timing. For example, a union that finds itself in an unfavorable bargaining position may
conclude that its only opportunity to exert pressure upon its employer will be to strike
during the time of year that its services are most needed. Agricultural workers might strike
during the harvest season; department store workers just before Christmas. Should strikes
of this sort be temporarily enjoined, a subsequent ruling upholding the union's right to
strike will do little to protect the workers' interest.
32 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Jan. 23, 1978) (No.
77-796).
11 Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW iocal 1766, No. 76-1785 (4th Cir. July 6, 1977); Cedar
Coal Co. v. UMW Local 1759, No. 76-1793 (4th Cir. July 6, 1977); Southern Ohio Coal Co.
v. UMW Local 1949, No. 76-1846 (4th Cir. July 6, 1977).
Nos. 76-1793 and 76-1785 were appeals from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia. No. 76-1846 was an appeal from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.
" Subparagraph III, (a)(7) of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974
provides: "The Employer shall station a responsible employee on the surface to communi-
cate at all times with the employees when they are at work underground." 560 F.2d at
1156. The union contended that the "responsible employee" should be an individual hired
for that specific purpose. The company maintained that the communications position
"could be assigned as an additional duty to an employee holding an existing bargaining
unit job." Id.
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UMW Local 1759. The complex litigation began when an arbi-
trator rendered an incomplete decision that failed to fully define
Cedar Coal's hiring obligations. 5 Rather than seek final resolution
of the issue in arbitration,36 the union struck in support of its
view.3 7 Alleging that Local 1759 had followed a "pattern and prac-
tice of refusing to submit ... disputes ... to peaceful settlement
through grievance and arbitration procedures, '3 8  Cedar Coal
brought a section 301 suit seeking injunctive relief and damages.3 9
The district court granted a temporary restraining order against
the strike and set a date for a hearing on Cedar's application for a
preliminary injunction.40 The hearing, however, never occurred.
Without explanation, the district court ordered an indefinite con-
tinuance4 despite expiration of the temporary restraining order,
effectively denying injunctive relief.
Soon after the primary strike began, pickets from Local 1759
appeared outside the entrance to two Cedar Coal mines under the
jurisdiction of UMW Local 1766. Local 1766 honored the picket
lines of its sister union, prompting Cedar Coal to seek injunctive
relief against the sympathy strikers.42 The district court dismissed
35 Id. at 1156-57. The arbitrator ruled that Cedar Coal was obligated to fill the com-
munications job with a union member. He initially failed to decide, however, whether the
surface position could be an "ancillary" assignment to an employee with other duties.
'6 Cedar Coal, Southern Ohio Coal, and the three striking UMW locals were all sig-
natories to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974 (id. at 1156, 1159,
1160), which includes the following broad dispute-resolution clause:
ARTICLE XXVII-MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF CONTRACT AND RESORT
TO COURTS
The United Mine Workers of America and the employers agree and affirm
that, except as provided herein, they will maintain the integrity of this contract
and that all disputes and claims which are not settled by agreement shall be settled
by the machinery provided in the "Settlement of Disputes" Article of this Agree-
ment unless national in character in which event the parties shall settle such dis-
putes by free collective bargaining as heretofore practiced in the industry, it being
the purpose of this provision to provide for the settlement of all such disputes and
claims through the machinery in this contract and by collective bargaining without
recourse to the courts.
Id. at 1156.
" Local 1759 represented the employees working at five mines owned by Cedar Coal.
At various times, the strike extended to certain mines without affecting others. Although
the strikers returned to work on several occasions, hostilities intensified when Cedar Coal
suspended two striking employees. Id. at 1156-57.
38Id. at 1157 (quoting Cedar Coal's complaint).
39 Id. The text of§ 301 is set out in part in note 12 supra.40 560 F.2d at 1157.
4 11d. at 1158.42 Id. at 1159.
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the company's complaint on the pleadings.43 While the litigation
involving Locals 1759 and 1766 was proceeding, UMW pickets also
appeared along the access road to a mine owned by Southern Ohio
Coal Co. 44 Members of Local 1949, the UMW affiliate represent-
ing Southern's employees, honored the picket lines.45 Southern
brought suit against Local 1949, alleging that the union had "en-
gaged in a willful and deliberate pattern of refusing and avoiding
compliance with the arbitration and grievance procedures, 46 re-
sorting instead to frequent work stoppages. Motions for a tempo-
rary restraining order and a preliminary injunction accompanied
Southern's complaint.47 Relying on Buffalo Forge, the district court
denied the motions. 48
After rejecting two union challenges to its appellate jurisdic-
tion,49 the Cedar Coal court confronted the locals' contention that
the injunctive aspects50 of each case had become moot, as the
strikes had ended during the pendency of the appeals.5 1 Relying
on the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" rule,52 the court
43 1d. at 1160. Cedar's subsequent motion for an injunction pending appeal was de-
nied. The company then appealed to judge Widener for an injunction pending appeal.
judge Widener denied the motion, noting that Buffalo Forge left the outcome on appeal too
uncertain to justify issuance of an injunction. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
4 Id. (quoting Southern's complaint).
4 7 
Id.
48 Id. Southern appealed the district court decision and sought an injunction pending
appeal. Id. at 1160-61.
49 First, Local 1766 argued that the district court order dismissing Cedar Coal's com-
plaint was not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). That statute provides in part:
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States. ... The union contended that the district court
ruling was not a final decision because subsequent amendment of Cedar Coal's complaint
might be permitted. 560 F.2d at 1161. Noting that the transcript indicated "that the order
was intended to be in all respects final," the court quickly disposed of the union's conten-
tion. Id. Second, Local 1759 asserted that the indefinite continuance of Cedar Coal's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction was not a denial of injunctive relief, and thus was not an
appealable interlocutory decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970). The court rejected
this argument. Under the given facts, the court observed, the indefinite continuance was
tantamount to an outright refusal to grant injunctive relief. 560 F.2d at 1161-62.
90 Local 1766 did not argue that Cedar Coal's claim for damages was moot. 560 F.2d at
1162.
5 1 Id.
" Under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" rule the temporary cessation
of challenged conduct does not render a dispute moot. The Supreme Court formulated
this principle in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911), which held that
the ICC could not evade appellate review by issuing a series of short-term orders. Id. at
515.
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found appellate review appropriate: the work stoppages were re-
current, but always ended before the injunction issue could reach
the appellate court.53 This result reflected the court's conviction
that short-term work stoppages subverted the pro-arbitration pol-
icy underlying Boys Markets.5 4 The procedural ruling presaged the
court's decision on the merits.
In addressing the substantive issues, the Cedar Coal court care-
fully distinguished among the three groups of strikers. Considering
first the primary strikers, the court quickly concluded that Local
17 59's actions satisfied the Boys Markets test for injunctive relief.55
Given the unquestioned arbitrability of the underlying dispute and
The employers in Cedar Coal argued that the "capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view" rule should apply because the union members had repeatedly engaged in strikes and
work stoppages in derogation of their contractual obligations to arbitrate grievances and
because this conduct was likely to recur. 560 F.2d at 1165-66. The Cedar Coal court ac-
cepted the substance of this argument. Since the employers' complaints had been dismissed
without adjudication on the merits, the court accepted their allegations regarding repeated
union strikes and work stoppages as true. See id. at 1165. The court then relied upon Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), and Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), for a cur-
rent formulation of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine. According to
the Weinstein Court:
Sosna decided that in the absence of a class action, the "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" doctrine was limited to the situation where two elements com-
bined: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.
Id. at 149. The Cedar Coal court concluded that both requisites were satisfied. See 560 F.2d
at 1165-66.
The unions in Cedar Coal had maintained that their employers' reliance on the "capa-
ble of repetition, yet evading review" rule was misplaced. Their view was that this doctrine
only applied where a governmental interest was involved. Id. at 1167. The court rejected
this contention. "As a matter of principle, we doubt that a court is any less obliged to do
justice between man and man than between citizen and sovereign." Id. Moreover, the court
noted that the result would be the same under the narrow construction advanced by the
unions:
[I]f the public interest is a sine qua non in determining whether or not the capable
of repetition, yet evading review doctrine is to be applied, and we doubt that it is,
we think the public has an interest in having decided the questions which have
arisen again and again between the parties here and which in the strike involved
in these cases directly affected almost the entire bituminous coal industry of the
nation.
Id. at 1168.53 Id. at 1165.
4 The court stated: "We may not close our eyes to the fact freely argued by the parties
that the strike which commenced with the grievance of Local 1759 spread to affect at least
a substantial part of the bituminous coal industry." Id. at 1161. The court's recognition of
the UMW's economic power suggested that it would look unfavorably upon technical ob-
jections designed to avoid the legal consequences of arguably proscribed work stoppages.
55 See id. at 1168; note 18supra.
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the local's short-tempered reaction to less than complete arbitral
victory, Boys Markets clearly controlled.
Having concluded that the primary strike should have been
enjoined, the court turned to the "principal problem": the proper
application of Buffalo Forge to the sympathy strikes of Locals 1766
and 1949.56 After reviewing the factual background of Buffalo
Forge, the court discussed the case's import:
We think the [Buffalo Forge] Court meant to tie together the
non-arbitrability of the underlying cause with the cause of the
strike at issue so that, when the underlying cause is not subject to
arbitration, a refusal to cross a picket line, generated by a strike
over the underlying cause, is not a violation of a no-strike clause
which is enforceable by injunction against the strike although it
may be by arbitration. In our opinion, the Court meant thus to
restrict the holding of Boys Markets, which many cases had taken
to be that if an issue were arbitrable, assuming other conditions
were met, an injunction might issue to prevent a strike pending
arbitration of the arbitrable issue. Following Buffalo Forge, it
seems that where the underlying issue is not arbitrable, then a
refusal to cross a picket line set up on account of that underlying
issue, although the refusal may be arbitrable, may not be pre-
vented by injunction pending arbitration. 57
The court found support for its analysis in the Buffalo Forge
Court's treatment of the conflicting court of appeals decisions fol-
lowing Boys Markets.58 Buffalo Forge, the court suggested, vindicated
the cautious approach adopted earlier by the Second, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits. 59 The Cedar Coal court, however, did not embrace
the "over an arbitrable grievance" test 60 that had been employed by
these circuits. The court apparently recognized that this test pro-
vides no real guidance in the sympathy strike context. 61 Sympathy
*6 560 F.2d at 1168.
57 Id. at 1169 (footnote omitted).
" See id. For the relevant discussion in Buffalo Forge, see 428 U.S. at 404 n.9.
59 560 F.2d at 1170. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
60 See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
61 The confusion stemming from use of the "over an arbitrable grievance" language is
well illustrated by Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW Local 1957, 551 F.2d 695 (1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 227 (1977). In that case, two UMW locals representing the plaintiff's
employees engaged in sympathy strikes in support of a sister local that had struck rather
than submit several grievances to arbitration. Concluding that the sympathy strikes were
"over" arbitrable issues, and that the sympathy strikers "will continue such work stoppages
whenever they again become dissatisfied over some conditions of work at the mine," the
district court issued preliminary injunctions against the sympathy strikers identical to the
19781
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strikes, by definition, are never "over an arbitrable grievance."
Rather, such strikes are over a sister union's grievance. If sympathy
strikers were bound to arbitrate the dispute underlying the pri-
mary strike, they would be primary strikers themselves. 63 Thus,
mechanical application of this test to sympathy strikes64 inexorably
leads to denial of injunctive relief.65 This result runs counter to the
Boys Markets policy of preventing the evasion of agreements to ar-
bitrate. Cedar Coal's rejection of the "over an arbitrable grievance"
test, however, did not signal a return to the Fourth Circuit's earlier
view that injunctive relief, even against sympathy strikes, was ap-
propriate whenever an employer could point to a broad compul-
sory arbitration clause.6 6 Buffalo Forge precluded such a simple
analysis.67 Accordingly, the Cedar Coal court struck a new balance:
where the object and potential effect of a sympathy strike are to
compel the primary strikers' employer to concede an arbitrable
prospective injunction imposed upon the primary union. Id. at 700. The next year the
three locals refused to cross "stranger" picket lines at the three sites. In response, the
plaintiff sought orders to show cause why the local unions should not be held in contempt.
Relying on Buffalo Forge (decided in the interim), the district court denied the motions. Id.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of preliminary in-
junctions, noting that the work stoppages "centered around issues that the unions were
contractually bound to arbitrate .... ." Id. at 701. Although upholding the theoretical
validity of the preliminary injunctions, the court vacated them on the grounds of vagueness
and overbreadth. Id. at 710. Significantly, the court also affirmed the district court's refusal
to hold the sympathy strikers in contempt. According to the Sixth Circuit, the "central
inquiry in Boys Markets cases . . . [is] whether the employees sought to be enjoined are
striking over issues which they have agreed to arbitrate." Id. at 703 (emphasis added). On
the given facts, the court concluded that the locals' refusal to cross the "stranger" picket
lines did not amount to "active participation in an illegal strike." Id. (footnote omitted).
Thus, despite its shortcomings, the "over an arbitrable grievance" test remains an integral
component of Sixth Circuit labor policy. Cf Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers, 549 F.2d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Buffalo Forge without explana-
tion of its sympathy strike context, as primary authority for the "over an arbitrable griev-
ance" standard).
62 For a brief discussion of sympathy strikes, see note 2 supra.
62 This statement is tautological. Nevertheless, a surprising number of courts have
failed to grasp the distinction between primary and sympathy strikes. See notes 19-20 and
accompanying text supra.
6' Regardless of the merits of the Cedar Coal decision, repudiation of the Boys Markets
"over an arbitrable grievance" test is overdue. Courts applying the test often placed seman-
tics over substance in determining which disputes were "over" arbitrable grievances. See,
e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th
Cir. 1972); Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union #53, 520 F.2d 1220
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976).
65 The "over an arbitrable grievance" test thus fosters result-oriented jurisprudence.
Courts taking a benign view of union work-stoppages in the sympathy strike context need
only invoke the test to justify a refusal of injunctive relief.66 See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
67 See notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
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issue to the primary striking union, injunctive relief is appro-
priate.68
The contours of this new test took shape as the court dealt
with each group of sympathy strikers. On its face, Local 1766's
strike resembled the production and maintenance workers' sym-
pathy strike in Buffalo Forge. In each case, the primary and sym-
pathy strikers worked for the same employer. In each case, the
sympathy strikers' collective bargaining accord was silent regarding
the applicability of the compulsory arbitration provisions to sym-
pathy strike situations. In Buffalo Forge, however, the underlying
dispute was not arbitrable; the office and technical employees had
no collective bargaining agreement. In contrast, all parties in Cedar
Coal agreed that the underlying dispute was arbitrable. The Cedar
Coal court initially admitted that Local 17 66's strike was not "over a
grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbi-
trate,' 69 as it was "at least arguable that Cedar could not have
conceded the arbitrable issue to Local 1766, it rather being en-
gaged in arbitration with Local 1759.,,70 Relying upon the newly
adopted "object of the strike" test, however, the court was able to
surmount this problem:
Here, the employer is the same as to both Locals; the collective
bargaining agreement is the same; the bargaining unit is the
same; the locality of employment is the same; and, most impor-
tandy, the purpose of 1766's refusal to cross the 1759 picket lines
was not to coerce Cedar into conceding an issue to local 1759
which was not arbitrable; rather, the purpose of the 1766 strike
was to coerce Cedar into conceding an issue to Local 1759 which
was admittedly arbitrable.71
Accordingly, the court ruled that "the Buffalo Forge exception to
Boys Markets should not apply,"7 2 and that the district court should
have enjoined the sympathy strike.
Analysis of the Local 1949 strike, however, led to the opposite
conclusion. Like Local 1766, Local 1949 engaged in a sympathy
strike in support of Local 1759. Unlike Local 1766, however, mem-
bers of Local 1949 were not employed by the same company as
Local 1759. After noting that Southern and Local 1949 had no
68 560 F.2d at 1170.
69 Id. at 1171 (quoting Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 254).
70 560 F.2d at 1171.
7 1 Id. at 1171-72.
72 Id. at 1172.
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dispute prior to the appearance of the UMW picket line, the court
stated:
Even considering that the underlying purpose of 1949's strike
may have been to put indirect pressure on Cedar to concede an
arbitrable issue to Local 1759, Southern could concede nothing
to Local 1759 because it was not bound to it by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, and there was no dispute between Southern
and Local 1759. 73
This language suggests that the "object of the strike" test contains
an "ability" component. Since Local 1949-unlike Local 1766-was
not employed by the same company as the primary strikers, it
could not exert effective pressure upon Cedar Coal, regardless of
its intentions. Thus, according to the court, Local 1949 could not
undermine arbitration by forcing Cedar Coal to concede an arbi-
trable issue to Local 1759. Although a union may intend to force
the concession of an arbitrable issue, injunctive relief is not ap-
propriate unless a sympathy strike realistically threatens the integ-
rity of the arbitration process. Applying this test to the activity of
Local 1949, Cedar Coal affirmed the district court's denial of pre-
liminary injunctive relief.
III
THE "OBJECT OF THE STRIKE" TEST:
A RATIONAL REFINEMENT
The Boys Markets "over an arbitrable grievance" test provided
little guidance to courts assessing the legality of sympathy strikes.7 4
The Fourth Circuit's "object of the strike" test represents a long-
needed refinement. Ironically, however, Cedar Coal's more careful
articulation of the principles underlying Buffalo Forge creates a split
over the proper standards for enjoining sympathy strikes-the very
split Buffalo Forge was intended to remedy.
In terms of precedent and policy, Cedar Coal's treatment of a
sympathy strike against a primary striker's employer is sound.
Reading Buffalo Forge as an absolute bar to sympathy strike injunc-
tions would undercut the accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia
and Taft-Hartley Acts established in Boys Markets; such an ap-
,aId. (footnote omitted).
' See notes 60-65 and accompanying text supra.
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proach would permit sympathy strikers to ignore their own no-
strike obligations with impunity, 5 while pressuring employers to
concede the primary dispute' and forgo the arbitral remedy for
which they contracted. The strong pro-arbitration language of Boys
Markets precludes such a repudiation of the doctrine that Norris-
LaGuardia must at times give way to concerns of federal labor
policy.76 There is no reason why the accommodation developed in
Boys Markets should not apply to sympathy strike injunctions, since
a sympathy strike may be just as effective as a primary strike in
forcing an employer to concede an arbitrable issue. Nor do the
policies underlying Boys Markets require a judicial retreat in the
area of sympathy strikes. Regardless of the proper interpretation
of the Taft-Hartley Act,7 7 section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
does not stand in isolated supremacy.7 8 Indeed, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act itself encourages "voluntary arbitration. '7 9 In addi-
tion, the public policy concerns that in another era might have
justified a literal application of Norris-LaGuardia are no longer
compelling. The federal judiciary of the 1970's no longer manifests
75 Sympathy strikers' immunity from injunction is lost when an arbitrator orders them
back to work. Only during the period preceding arbitration of the applicability of a no-
strike clause is a striking union protected by Norris-LaGuardia. See, e.g., Pacific Maritime
Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 517 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.
1975); General Dynamics Corp. v. Local 5, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Work-
ers, 469 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1972); Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's
& Warehousemen's Union, 454 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1971).
T6 The Supreme Court stressed that "[s]tatutory interpretation requires more than con-
centration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total corpus of
pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions." 398 U.S. at
250. It went on to note "that the unavailability of equitable relief in the arbitration context
presents a serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the voluntary establish-
ment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes .... Id. at 253.
77 For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, see
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485-546 (1957) (dissenting opinion,
Frankfurter, J.) (app.).
78 See note 16 and accompanying text supra. See also Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions,
and the Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215, 235; Smith, The Supreme Court,
Boys Markets Labor Injunctions, and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 321, 341-42
(1977); Comment, The Return of the Strike Injunction, 51 B.U. L. REV. 665, 675-76 (1971);
Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets Injunctions to Refusals To Cross a Picket Line, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 113, 135-36 (1976).
79 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970) provides:
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant
who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in
the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to
settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available gov-
ernmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.
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the anti-union bias that prompted passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 80 and organized labor wields far more political power today
than it did in the early decades of this century. 81 Indeed, the
UMW's actions in Cedar Coal suggest that unions aggrieved by the
results of injunctive proceedings have sufficient political and
economic vitality to violate a federal court order without fear of
jeopardizing their continued existence. 82 Thus, if a sympathy strike
severely threatens an employer's ability to vindicate his contractual
rights in the arbitral forum, both precedent and policy support an
injunction against that strike. A sympathy strike-like the primary
strike enjoined in Boys Markets-may effectively foreclose the em-
ployer from relying on the contractually mandated arbitration
mechanism. Such a strike should be enjoined.
The preceding discussion illustrates the fundamental im-
provement wrought by the Cedar Coal test for injunctive relief.
Courts applying the "over an arbitrable grievance" test prior to
Buffalo Forge either applied the test so narrowly as to preclude by
definition all sympathy strikes,83 or deemed any sympathy strike by
a union subject to a broad arbitration provision and a no-strike
80See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). In his Buf-
falo Forge dissent, Justice Stevens noted that "experience during the decades since the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed has dissipated any legitimate concern about the impartial-
ity of federal judges in disputes between labor and management .... Id. at 432.
Even if a particular judge does possess an anti-union bias, it is at least arguable that
it is not in management's interest to take advantage of it. The employer-employee relation-
ship is a continuing one; cordial relations between the parties may be of mutual benefit
long after litigation ceases. The acrimony engendered by hard-fought litigation may reduce
the employee's willingness to satisfactorily perform current obligations and to engage in
future good faith negotiations. Hence, there may be a significant incentive for manage-
ment to resolve disputes amicably at the pre-litigation stage. Cf. Macneil, The Many Futures
of Contracts, 47 S. CALIF. L. REv. 691, 781-82 (1974) (mutual cooperation in contract plan-
ning and performance benefits both employers and employees).
81 One commentator has noted the
improved position in which labor unions now find themselves in the United States.
The relationship between organized labor and capital can no longer be gener-
alized into one involving unequal parties in an atmosphere of bitter social strife.
Indeed, in some instances, it is the unions which now hold the cards of power.
Gould, supra note 78, at 236 (footnotes omitted). The economic power wielded by unions is
well illustrated by the fact that in one two-year period wildcat strikes alone accounted for
23,000,000 tons in lost coal production. Note, Prospective Boys Markets Injunctions, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 790, 798 (1977). Given this state of affairs, it is safe to say that judicial supervision
of labor disputes to the extent necessary to protect the arbitration process will not severely
injure the labor movement.
82 For example, in Cedar Coal, Local 1759 ignored the temporary restraining order
issued against it. 560 F.2d at 1157.
83 See notes 60-65 and accompanying text supra.
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clause to be "over" the applicability of that clause and therefore
enjoinable.8 4 Neither approach addressed the central reason for
the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act: the need
for equitable relief to preclude economic arm-twisting pending ar-
bitration. 5 The "object of the strike" test requires a court to focus
on this central issue.
The most serious difficulty with this new standard is the flexi-
bility it gives reviewing courts. The facts of Cedar Coal suggest that
the requisite purpose can be inferred only if the sympathy strike
will exert pressure on the primary employer 6 to concede an issue
subject to binding arbitration. Thus, the crucial element of the test
is a finding of sufficient coercive power. In Cedar Coal the differ-
ence in employers served to distinguish Locals 1766 and 1949.
Since Local 1949 had no contractual relationship with Cedar Coal,
the court presumed that it lacked the ability to force the company
to concede an arbitrable issue to Local 1759.87 The common-
employer distinction, however, will not suffice in many instances.
Where the economic vitality of one company is strongly dependent
upon its relationship with another, a primary strike against the
dependent employer accompanied by a sympathy strike against the
other company may force a rapid settlement of the underlying
dispute on the union's terms. The dependent company may con-
clude that even an unsatisfactory resolution of its labor disputes is
preferable to jeopardizing a crucial economic relationship.,
Given the different attitudes evidenced by the circuits prior to
Buffalo Forge8 9 and the potential flexibility of the economic effect
standard, even universal adoption of the Cedar Coal test may lead to
14 See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
85 In Boys Markets the Court found "that the unavailability of equitable relief in the
arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the
voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes ......
398 U.S. at 253.
86 The Fourth Circuit mentioned no specific evidence of Local 1766's "purpose." The
economic pressure of their sympathy strike made their motives sufficiently culpable.
87 See 560 F.2d at 1172.
88 A simple hypothetical illustrates the limited utility of the common/separate employer
distinction. Assume that UAW Local A represents the employees of an automobile com-
ponent manufacturer that sells all its products to General Motors, and that UAW Local B
represents the production employees of General Motors. Assume that after Local A goes on
strike against the component manufacturer and establishes picket lines outside the General
Motors plant, Local B engages in a sympathy strike. Under such circumstances, GM would
pressure the component manufacturer into conceding the disputed issues to Local A, since
a prolonged strike would seriously interfere with GM's production.
'9 See notes 19-24 and accompanying text supra.
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inconsistent results. Universal adoption, however, is unlikely. Al-
though Cedar Coal provides a new rationale enabling the Third,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits to continue to enjoin sympathy strikes,
the Supreme Court's effusive use of the "over an arbitrable griev-
ance" language in Buffalo Forge9" allows the Second, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits to continue to use the "over" language in a semantic
fashion. 91 Thus, Cedar Coal suggests, if nothing else, that Buffalo
Forge's effort to eliminate the post-Boys Markets split among the
circuits has failed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon its construction of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770 and Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW Local 1759, held that an injunction may
issue against sympathy strikers whenever the "object" of the strike
is to compel an employer to concede an arbitrable issue. Under the
"object of the strike" test there are two requirements for injunctive
relief. First, the striking union must intend to force the concession
of an arbitrable issue. Second, the union must actually have the
ability to compel this result. The Cedar Coal test is consistent with
recent judicial efforts to accommodate the conflicting provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley Acts. The Fourth Circuit's
pragmatic approach directs analysis toward consideration of the
90 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
91 The ambiguous language chosen by the Buffalo Forge Court permits two equally
plausible constructions of its holding. The Court noted "that the strike was not over any
dispute between the Union and the employer that was even remotely subject to the arbitra-
tion provisions of the contract." 428 U.S. at 407 (emphasis in original). This language will
permit the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits to read Buffalo Forge as a reaffirmation of the
"over an arbitrable grievance" test, and to continue to deny injunctive relief. The Seventh
Circuit, which prior to Buffalo Forge had taken a somewhat different approach (see note 24
and accompanying text supra), may now tend toward this view. See Zeigler Coal Co. v. Local
1870, UMW, 566 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1977).
The Buffalo Forge Court also stressed, however, that the sympathy strike "had neither
the purpose nor the effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving
the employer of his bargain." Id. at 408 (emphasis added). This language provides direct
support for the purpose and ability components of the Cedar Coal test. See text accompany-
ing notes 71-73 supra. The length of the Buffalo Forge opinion further supports the Fourth
Circuit's view that Buffalo Forge did not simply reaffirm the "over an arbitrable grievance"
test; had the Court intended to do so, it easily could have done so on the basis of the
Second Circuit's opinion. In short, Buffalo Forge will not absolutely bar the Third, Fourth,
and Eighth Circuits from enjoining sympathy strikes.
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actual effects of union activity and away from the semantic debate
that frequently obscured the crucial issues in earlier cases. Al-
though its inherent flexibility may produce the same split of au-
thority that existed prior to Buffalo Forge, the "object of the strike"
test represents a logical outgrowth of Supreme Court doctrine on
strike injunctions. Other courts should adopt and apply it.
Jonathan Craig Thau
